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ABSTRACT
Article 29 of the Kuwaiti Constitution states that “The people are peers in human dignity
and have, in the eyes of the Law, equal public rights and obligations. There shall be made no
differentiation among them because of gender, origin, language or religion.” If I were to say that
the 17, 818 km ² that make up the State of Kuwait is home to 4.2 million people, it would be a
misrepresentation. While 4.2 million people do live in Kuwait, citizenship and immigration laws
restrict 70% of its population, to varying degrees, from making their country of residence a
home. Despite the promise of article 29, the stark and rigid stratification caused by these laws is
in fact by design and a necessary function, rather than an unintentional byproduct of the
legitimization process of the state, and by extension citizenship. The oppressive function of said
citizenship-based stratification is justified through conceptions of race, class, and gender.
I define and discuss three categories within Kuwait’s population, each of which offer vast
complexities that warrant deep investigation and analysis: Kuwaiti citizens, migrants, and
stateless persons. For the purpose of this thesis however, it is most beneficial to understand them
contextually and in relation to each other. Kuwait’s citizenship, or Nationality Law, created a
sizable population of stateless persons whose very existence has been criminalized since their
1985 inclusion in the Aliens Residence law of 1959. Kuwait utilizes the Kafala system, in which
the migrant is almost completely dependent on their sponsor. Citizenship in the State of Kuwait
is defined through patrilineal lineage influenced by historical and religious conceptions of race,
ethnicity, and genealogy.
In this thesis, I provide a historical and contextual overview outlining the nature and
function of two pivotal citizenship and immigration legal developments in Kuwait; Kuwait’s
Nationality Law promulgated in 1959, and the 1985 implementation of the Aliens Residence law
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of 1959, in relation to stateless persons. By analyzing the two focal legal documents mentioned
above, I trace the effects of the policies on racial attitudes and conceptions, as well as class and
gender divisions across citizenship and legal status stratum.
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INTRODUCTION
Noncitizens make up about 70% of Kuwait’s 4.2 million population (MacroTrends 2020).
Nationality and immigration laws play an important role in the maintenance of power and
privilege in this nation that is roughly the size of the state of New Jersey. The stratification
caused by these laws is in fact by design and a necessary function, rather than an unintentional
byproduct of the legitimization process of the state, and by extension citizenship. The oppressive
function of said citizenship-based stratification is justified through conceptions of race, class, and
gender. In this thesis, I provide an overview of the role nationality and immigration laws in
Kuwait play in the maintenance of racial, class, and gender-based stratification. With the use of
archival research, this investigation focuses on three key categories, (1) Kuwaiti citizens, (2)
Kuwait’s stateless persons, also known as the Bedoon (the Arabic word meaning “without”), and
(3) migrants. Not to be confused with the Arabic word for the semi-nomadic people in the region
referred to as Beduins (pronounced “bed-wins”), Bedoon is pronounced “bid-oon.” My use of the
words migrants and migration is intentional as migration refers to temporary movement while
immigration refers to permanent residency. Despite a recent push among activists in Kuwait to
refer to noncitizens as residents to emphasize their belonging and investment in the country amid
growing xenophobic rhetoric and policies, I will be using the word migrants to emphasize the
structures that prevent or make it harder for them to do so. Due to Kuwait’s
immigration/migration laws, non-citizens are only able to obtain temporary visas, requiring
constant renewal. Non-citizens are not allowed to own land, be sole owners of companies in the
country, or be guaranteed permanent residency. For those reasons, non-citizens are excluded
from setting up roots, therefore the temporary conditions that the words migrants/migration refer
to are most appropriate. I will break down the variations within Kuwaiti citizenship, exploring
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how identity politics, lineage, and patriarchy help maintain power and racial structures even
within this dominant group.
My hypothesis is that Kuwait’s Nationality Law of 1959 and the inclusion of the Bedoon
in the Aliens Residence Law in 1985 maintain stratification in three crucial ways: (1)
perpetuating historically rooted conceptions of lineage, which inform current ethnic and racial
attitudes, (2) enforcing cultural and religious based gender roles, and (3) linking class to
citizenry:
1. Kuwait’s citizenship is based on narrow rules of lineage influenced by historical
conceptions of race and ethnicity. Since Kuwait’s ruling family’s claim to power is
through lineage, Kuwaiti citizens are less likely to dispute their claim to power as it
parallels their claim to citizenship.
2. Kuwaiti citizenship can be passed down to children by a Kuwaiti father, but a Kuwaiti
mother can only pass down limited government benefits to her children, not actual
citizenship. This blatantly sexist system defines lineage through patriarchal standards,
designating a special category of sub-citizenry based on sex. This discriminatory
designation is not limited to parent-child relationships; Kuwaiti males have the ability to
pass their citizenship to their non-Kuwaiti spouse, while their female counterparts do not
have the power to pass theirs to anyone at all.
3. The ability to obtain and pass down Kuwaiti citizenship has direct economic and social
status implications that perpetuate a stark class divide.
Kuwait has defined itself through exclusion in the form of migration/immigration policies that
make permanent residency virtually impossible and access to state services separate and unequal
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(ILO, Policy Brief No. 2: REFORM OF THE KAFALA (SPONSORSHIP) SYSTEM). I ask in
what ways these laws maintain racial, class, and gender-based stratification.
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PART I: RESEARCH METHODS AND DESIGN
Due to time limitations and Covid travel restrictions, my research has been conducted
mostly remotely from Knoxville, Tennessee. By the time I was able to travel to Kuwait with
hopes of accessing archives from Kuwait’s National Archive and National Library, I had reached
the end stages of my writing process. Kuwait had very strict Covid-19 regulations, which
prohibited any unvaccinated persons from entering public buildings, requiring registration
through an app connected to government vaccination records. Despite having been vaccinated
since April, I was unable to enter any public buildings. My foreign vaccination card required
time to be processed and entered into the system. This dashed any hopes I had of entering the
National Library. Thankfully, historical archival and Social legal methodology can be done
remotely and does not require travel or face to face interaction. The documents I needed are not
rare, sensitive, or hard to come by. Both documents that this research is based on, the Nationality
Law 1959 and Aliens Residence Law 1959, are available on the National Assembly website in
Arabic and have been translated into English on many labor, immigration, and human rights
websites, which allowed for direct English reference.
Being a native Arabic speaker and a fluent English speaker, I was able to analyze the
laws in their original language. The fact that I was looking at legal documents meant that they
would likely be readily available in English as well. The process of requesting documents or data
from the government is long and arduous, especially when done remotely and during a
pandemic. My selection of these documents was not only based on their relevance to my research
question, given my time and physical access limitations, their availability online was imperative
as well. However, this methodology, and even more so the travel restrictions and long-term
uncertainty of Covid-19, did not allow for any kind of ethnographic interviews. In the future, I
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would love to include in my research the voices of Kuwait’s stateless, migrant, naturalized, and
Kuwaiti-born citizens. There are many initiatives, organizations, and activists in Kuwait doing
work that would be beneficial to this research.
I chose to use legal documents because laws are objects of nation building, therefore,
they are imbued with different types of positive and negative aspects of nation building,
including the process of exclusion. Laws are an expression of that process; they are legislative
documents that reflect the attitudes of a society. They perpetuate a certain image to the world,
but are themselves imbued with race, class, and gender structures. The image projected through
the laws of a state poses an issue of subjectivity. “In theory, Kuwait's Nationality Law provides
numerous means for individuals to acquire Kuwaiti nationality. However, many of its provisions
violate the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, or status, and
undermine the ability of children to exercise their right to acquire a nationality.” (Kuwait:
Promises Betrayed - Discrimination Based on Origin and Status: The Bidun 2000) Often times,
the implementation of certain laws is halted by technicalities, loopholes, and government
inaction. But it is these instances, when coupled with context and follow up, that provide the
most insight into the stratification process.
The Nationality Law 1959 is a legal document defining the inclusions and exclusions of
Kuwaiti citizenship. It is an integral legislative document that clearly demonstrates the link
between citizenship and the racial, class, and gender-based stratification in Kuwait. The law
details stipulations of genuine claim for automatic citizenship as well as the conditions and
limitations of naturalization. It is both a reflection of the attitudes and conceptions held by the
people in Kuwait, and their continued institutionalization. The Aliens Residence Law 1959, and
its application to the Bedoon in particular in 1985, mark a shift in the categorization of stateless
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persons. The document also outlines legal implications of this shift, which allow for a critical
interrogation of their stratifying consequences.
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PART II: HISTORICAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT
The lines drawn in the sands of what was to become the Gulf region were an imperialist
import. The largely nomadic people of these lands viewed geography through “ever-shifting
tribal influence rather than fixed boundaries and had no use for territorial demarcation” (Hanieh
2017:5). By the end of the nineteenth century however, British colonial rule had implemented a
divide-and-rule strategy by sanctioning and supporting “the concentration of power within the
hands of individual rulers who were connected to a wider ruling family and could trace their
origins to one of the Arabian Peninsula tribes” (Hanieh 2017:5). By imperialist design, these
rulers were economically subordinated through British-controlled trade (mainly pearls, dates, and
fish) and relied on the British for survival. This history has a direct link to conceptions of
belonging and borders in relation to regional migrants and the Bedoon. In fact, the Bedoon
present a complication for the colonial logic behind the structure and parameters of the state
itself, and its citizenship.
It is important to understand the history of the region in order to understand how the royal
family and Kuwait’s wealthy merchant families came to power, and the colonial ideologies that
guided the establishment of the modern state of Kuwait. The "formation of Kuwait as an
autonomous polity is intrinsically tied to British dominion within the Persian Gulf and the wider
Indian Ocean area" (Tyler 2017). The 1700's were a period of growth for Kuwait as it gradually
established itself as a pivotal trading post. With its strategic location nestled between
economically powerful cities in Asia, East Africa, and modern-day Turkey, it became a major
trading route for the East India Company. As maritime commerce boomed in Kuwait, the threat
of the Ottoman Empire's proximity grew with it. Seeking protection from the looming danger of
the Ottoman Empire, the tiny Sheikhdom of Kuwait secretly signed the Anglo-Kuwaiti
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Agreement of 1899 with the British government. Al-Saud, a formidable warring people from
Najd (in modern day Saudi Arabia) who called on religious justification of militant expansion,
also pushed its weaker neighbors (Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar) more firmly
into the arms of British protection [Figure 1]. This relationship would only be strengthened by
the discovery of oil in Kuwait in February of 1938. This was an important step in the
development of Kuwaiti financial institutions, as well as the positioning of a select number of
families in advantageous economic positions which will accumulate through the generations. By
the 1920s, most of the Gulf were already tightly inserted in the British colonial system (with the
exception of Saudi Arabia) as they embarked on the emerging oil era.
Through the Anglo-Kuwaiti agreement of 1899, the British had pledged to protect Kuwait
from the Ottoman Empire and other foreign attacks in exchange for exclusive access (including
trade and leased land) to the Sheikhdom as well as the regulation of its internal affairs (Asman
2019; Willem 2019) [Figure 2]. The British eventually tightened their control on the entire
region by dividing the Gulf into what are now the six states that make up the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), which includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates [Figure 3]. The repercussions of these imposed boundaries are present to this day.
Border disputes between Kuwait and Iraq, Iran and the UAE, Saudi Arabia and the emirate of
Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Bahrain, the emirate of Ras Al Khaimeh and Oman, and so forth are born
out of the legacy of imperial policies (Anscombe 1997). This is also directly linked to the
discussion of belonging and borders in relation to regional migrants and the Bedoon, which I will
discuss in later sections. While Kuwait was never a formal British colony, the Kingdom's
influence was prolific and long lasting in all aspects of Kuwaiti government and life. The
influence of this treaty, which was honored until 1961, marking Kuwait's independence, is
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Figure 1: “Map of Middle East at 1837AD.” From TimeMaps.
https://www.timemaps.com/history/middle-east-1837ad/

Figure 2: Vandenbroeck, Eric. 30 Dec. 2017. “Overview of the Middle East.” From My World
Journal.
http://world-news-research.com/middleeast.html.
9

Figure 3: “Persian Gulf – Map Middle East.” From Geographic Guides.
https://www.geographicguide.com/asia/maps/middleeast.htm
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persistent to this day and most apparent in the country’s market. While American franchises have
blanketed Kuwait’s market in the last few decades, it was British companies that had dominated
in every industry, from food and beverages, to clothing and entertainment, as a tentacle of its
colonial project.
The racial structure in Kuwait is influenced by several complex historical and global forces
including trade, colonialism, neoliberalism, and capitalism. Racial hierarchies, developed over
time through complex geopolitical relationships, serve Kuwait’s current neoliberal practices and
capitalist projects. Many characteristics of Kuwait’s current racial structure have roots tracing
back to pre-Islamic SWANA (Southwest Asia and North Africa), which were furthered by
colonial ideology and sustainably fueled by the elite of Kuwaiti society’s conscious, or
subconscious, desire to maintain power through the racial hierarchy.
Consciousness of race and difference in the SWANA region is directly tied to transnational
labor and migration practices, and so is Kuwait’s conceptualization of belonging and statehood.
This thread offers an ideological evolution impacted heavily by Kuwait’s geographical location,
colonialism, neoliberalism, and capitalism. Kuwait, as a modern neoliberal state, necessitates
labor migration and benefits from the existence of a stateless population. “In terms of
globalization, labor migration has become a central component of the capitalist system” (Rana
2011:14).
Chouki El Hamel writes about cultural conceptions of belonging within the SWANA region
in his book Black Morocco: A History of Slavery, Race, and Islam. The book confronts the Arab
lineage system claiming it “permitted considerable racial co-optation.” (El Hamel 2012:94) The
hierarchy within the Arab lineage system placed value on proximity to an Arab identity, and the
most value on a patrilineal link to the Prophet. "The construction of races and racial attitudes
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found fertile ideological soil through various genealogies of Islamic affiliation that became an
important means to establish social status and social harmony, both of which conferred
justification for the imposition of political authority in lands that were occupied, and have been
occupied for generations, by people who were darker skinned" (El Hamel 2012:93).
Although slavery existed in the region for centuries, it functioned very differently from the
subsequent European and American form of slavery. In Islamic societies, “the institution of
slavery was not drawn strictly along racial lines” (El Hamel 2012:10). El Hamel however
describes the practice of categorizing slaves into different groups, assigning them to certain
activities or employments based on their physiognomy. This categorization created a stigmatized
representation of ethnic or race-based hierarchy. "This traditional way of classifying peoples by
skin color and then evaluating their relative level of individual capacity and social achievement
according to a continuum of coloration with light skin being regarded as highest or best provided
the basis for how blacks were perceived among the light-skinned Arab-Berber people of North
Africa" (El Hamel 2012: Pg. 76). This type of racial categorization in relation to labor is
supervened by the comfort with which ‘modern’ Kuwaitis racialize industries. It is common for
people in Kuwait to refer to their domestic workers as “their Filipinos” or “their Indians,” both
nationalities that make up a large percentage of domestic labor.
There is not modernity without racism because modernity defines itself against the so-called
unmodern, the uncivilized, and the racialized ‘other.’ The idea of the “modern” cannot exist
without an antithesis of the “primitive.” This was integral for White Europeans as well as Arabs
as they embarked on journeys wherein, they encountered different peoples and different ways of
being. Before these encounters, White Europeans defined themselves based on a multitude of
differences present within the European continent from language, lineage, religion, culture, and
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geography. Arabs placed a heavy emphasis on patrilineal genealogy and kinship in determining
otherness and belonging. Once they began to encounter a larger and more diverse world, their
way of being was challenged by alternatives. This was when they first defined themselves
through the negation of others. In the case of White Europeans, a continent which once
considered itself diverse and complex now defined itself as a homogenous. A white entity, while
at times warring, claimed to belong to the same “civilized” and “modern” world. To place
themselves at the top of this “new world,” Europeans invented the dichotomy of “modern” and
“primitive” with categories that would favor them (McKay 2020). Kuwait’s adoption of these
colonial dichotomies was made easier due to existing hierarchal social systems in the region.
This allowed the Kuwaiti elites to put themselves at the top, or at the very least, on top of
someone else. “Race acts as a sociopolitical mechanism that sorts society into hierarchical
racialized social systems” (McKay 2020:4). With migrants accounting for 70% of the country’s
population, Kuwaiti’s have automatically secured themselves a spot in the top 30% (Marcotrends
2015).

13

PART III: LAYERS OF CITIZENSHIP
Migrants and stateless peoples are not the only ones stuffed at the bottom to bolster up
the position of “the Kuwaiti” in the hierarchy. Categories within Kuwaiti citizenship are also
stacked and ranked based on gender, kinship, and ethnicity. Beduins, who have historically been
nomads but eventually assimilated to city life, do benefit greatly from their Kuwaiti citizenship,
but also suffer from the social stigma of being more “primitive” because they seem to hold on to
traditions more stringently than their city dwelling counterparts. This resentment of holding on to
tradition is a thinly veiled chastising of a culture that is not “modern,” which is to say Western.
Studying the categorizations within a group that has been lumped together through their
racialization is essential when looking at racial structures. Adopting the white/black binary
perpetuates the erasure of the experiences and histories of cultures while maintaining whiteness
as the default (McKay, 2020).
The very first article in Kuwait’s constitution asserts that “Kuwait is an Arab,
independent, fully sovereign State,” and that “the people of Kuwait are part of the Arab Nation.”
Kuwait’s identity is tightly bound to being Arab which illustrates a transnational identity linking
it to other Arab nations. Article 12 of Kuwait’s constitution stipulates that “the State shall
maintain the Islamic and Arab heritage and shall share in the path of civilization and
humanitarianism.” Kuwait has more than 300 non-Muslim citizens, the majority being Christians
and Bahais. While these citizens are Arab, their religion ostracizes them socially. In 1982, the
parliament amended the constitution to “bar non-Muslims from naturalization.” Since then,
“there have been multiple proposals made to amend the nationality law to allow non-Muslims to
become citizens, but in 2019 the government made clear that its policy was to keep "the current
text."
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Kuwaiti nationals can be divided into two categories: (1) the ‘original Kuwaitis’, and (2)
naturalized citizens. The stateless Bedoon are notably missing from this equation because they
are not included in the census. The “original Kuwaitis”, were the people who lived within the
confines of a wall (Al Sur), built around the tiny Kuwait back then called Al-Kout, in 1920 and
their descendants. The wall was built for protection from militia attacks campaigned by the first
monarch of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud. Thusly, the first and highest category of citizenship was
defined by the historical physical space people occupied, essentially excluding the area’s quasinomadic Bedouin population. This ominously foreshadows the use of physical space for
exclusionary practices and justification in the future, which will be detailed in later sections. The
year 1920 serves as a line in the sand demarcating legitimate claim to the Kuwaiti nationality.
Article 1 of the “Nationality Law creates a category of "original Kuwaiti nationals" who are, by
nature of that status, eligible for a higher level of rights and protections in Kuwaiti law (Kuwait:
Promises Betrayed - Discrimination Based on Origin and Status: The Bidun 2000). These
‘original nationals’ are defined as "persons who were settled in Kuwait prior to 1920 and who
maintained their normal residence there until the date of the publication of the law (May 21,
1959)" (Kuwait: Promises Betrayed - Discrimination Based on Origin and Status: The Bidun
2000). Consequently, people who were unable to prove settled residence, including many
Beduins, or tribal and nomadic groups, were excluded from automatic nationality. These people
now make up one of the categories of the country’s Bedoon population.

The second class of citizenship, which applies to those who were naturalized, includes
Persian families and Arabs who migrated to Persia in the eighteenth century in pursuit of
economic opportunities but returned at the advent of the oil era in the 1940s and 1950s
(Abdulkarim 2017). After 1960, however, naturalization would become exponentially difficult.
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Kuwait restricted the number of naturalizations of non-Gulf Arabs to only fifty per year. This
distinction between Gulf Arabs (or Khaleejis) and non-Gulf Arabs is another significant layer of
categorization within the hierarchies present in Kuwaiti and Arab society. It carries with it class
implications and further solidifies regional attitudes towards lineage. In 1981, an additional
condition for naturalization was introduced, requiring candidates to be Muslim (Longva 1997).
This demonstrated a relatively rapid succession of increasingly exclusive definitions of
citizenship and national identity.

Children born to Kuwaiti fathers, and those born to unknown parents are considered
Kuwaiti at birth. All other citizens are considered naturalized citizens, including children born to
a Kuwaiti mother and a foreign father. Minor children of naturalized fathers are also
automatically naturalized, but the same is not true for naturalized mothers.

The Nationality Law contains five articles which provide for naturalization, all subject to
the discretion of the Ministry of Interior. Article 3 allows naturalization of the child of a
Kuwaiti mother and an unknown father. Article 4 allows naturalization of any adult who
meets the following conditions:

1. that he has lawfully resided in Kuwait for at least twenty consecutive years or for at
least fifteen consecutive years if he is an Arab belonging to an Arab country....
2. that he has a lawful means of earning his living, is of good character and has not been
convicted of an honor-related crime or of an honesty-related crime;
3. that he has knowledge of the Arabic language;
4. that he possesses qualifications or renders services needed in Kuwait;
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5. that he be an original Muslim by birth, or that he has converted to Islam according to
the prescribed rules and procedures and that a period of at least five years has passed
since he embraced Islam before the grant of naturalization. Nationality thus acquired
is ipso facto lost and the decree of naturalization rendered void ab initio if the naturalized
person expressly renounces Islam or if he behaves in such a manner as clearly indicates
his intention to abandon Islam. In any such case, the nationality of any dependent of the
apostate who has acquired it upon the naturalization of the apostate is also rendered void.

Article 4 further limits the number of individuals naturalized by requiring a quota for the
number of naturalizations per year be set. “Indeed, while there were twenty nationalityrelated laws and decrees passed in the period from December 1959 to September 1997,
only one, Law 49/1984, sets a quota for naturalizations under article 4 (Council of
Ministers Legal Advice and Legislation Administration, Guide to Laws and Regulations
Issued by the State of Kuwait: From 1954 to the End of 1997. 1999).
“In theory, Kuwait's Nationality Law provides numerous means for individuals to acquire
Kuwaiti nationality. However, many of its provisions violate the principle of non-discrimination
on the basis of gender, religion, or status, and undermine the ability of children to exercise their
right to acquire a nationality.” (Kuwait: Promises Betrayed - Discrimination Based on Origin and
Status: The Bidun 2000) Kuwaiti-born mothers are denied the right to pass down their
citizenship to their children born to foreign fathers, while the wives of naturalized and Kuwaitiborn men are presented with a naturalization pathway. “The foreign wife of a naturalized
Kuwaiti man must declare her desire for naturalization within one year of her husband's
naturalization to be eligible for naturalization through him. A foreign wife of a Kuwaiti national
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may also be eligible for naturalization through her husband under article 8. A wife becomes
eligible after the passage of fifteen years after declaring her desire for naturalization, provided
she remains married for that full period. In the case of divorce or death of the husband before the
end of the fifteen-year period, wives who have a child from that husband and who have
maintained their legal residence in Kuwait for the full period are eligible for naturalization”
(Kuwait: Promises Betrayed - Discrimination Based on Origin and Status: The Bidun 2000).
There are no provisions in the law for foreign husbands to acquire nationality through their
Kuwaiti wives.

Early Waves of Immigration
The 17th century drought brought about heightened tribal tensions in the region. In 1613,
a group of nomadic and semi-nomadic families from the Saudi Arabian region of Najd
immigrated to the geographic area that would later become Al Kout, and eventually Kuwait. The
families from Najd (colloquially referred to as Neyada meaning “from Najd”) populated the
seaside area in search of better resources and a better life. Among the first of the Neyada was the
Bani Khaled family, a large and wealthy family that is spread across the Arabian Peninsula as far
as Iraq, Oman, and Jordan. Sometime after the arrival of the Bani Khaled family, other families
from Najd began immigrating to Kuwait, including the intermarrying Al Sabah, Al Khalifa, and
the Al Jalahma families. Most of the Neyada were landowners and traders who owned ships (for
trade and pearl diving), allowing them to accumulate considerable wealth and standing over the
years. In fact, as Kuwait grew in population and size, a need for leadership grew with it. A
member of Al Sabah family was nominated for the position following his reputation as a
community leader and mediator, with the stipulation refraining the royal family from trade. The
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Al Sabah family accepted, and the Bani Khaled family continued to be one of the wealthiest in
the country. These founding families would later dub themselves as Asileen, the Arabic word for
“originals.” This status continues to hold an elite and exclusive context in Kuwait, and the
families tend to intermarry within themselves and discourage marriage with others (The Center
for Kuwaiti Research and Studies 2014).

Just as the first significant period of immigration, which led to the settlement of Kuwait
was motivated by a drought, the second was triggered by a regional famine. 1867 was known as
Sinat Al Haylag, or the year of the Haylag. The origin of the word Haylag is still disputed with
some claiming it to be from the Arabic word for collective exhaustion, while others argue it
means ‘to speak another language.’ This wave of immigration consisted mostly of people from
Iran who did not speak Arabic. While some only stayed in Kuwait for the three harshest years of
the famine, many stayed indefinitely. This marked the first intermingling of cultures since the
area’s settlement by the Neyada, also marking the beginning of exclusionary understandings of
the people living there. The settlement of these ‘others’ prompted the Neyada to define
themselves in opposition of these new and foreign families. While there are many more groups,
tribes, and ethnic categories within Kuwaiti society, these two periods in time are most important
to understanding the surviving ideologies of ethnic and lineal divisions among the highest
category of Kuwaiti citizenship (The Center for Kuwaiti Research and Studies 2014).
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PART IV: THE BEDOON
The category of the Bedoon was invented along with the idea of borders and nation-states.
When the colonial concept of borders was introduced into the region, it imposed structures and
procedures that were not compatible with and/or initially accepted by all that occupied the
impacted lands. When Kuwait’s Nationality Law was promulgated in 1959, some quasi-nomadic
peoples called Beduins failed to register as citizens, creating the first of two categories of the
Bedoon. The second category includes migrants from neighboring Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other
Arab countries who “abandoned their native citizenship” (Abdulkarim 2017:6). Due to their
exclusion from the census, and current illegal status, the criminalization of which happened
through the implementation of the Aliens Residence law in 1985, no official population figures
are available for the Bedoon.
In 1957 – three years before its independence – Kuwait conducted its first census.
The population was estimated at 206,000, with Kuwaitis accounting for 55% of that
figure. This proportion decreased to 45% by 1961. In 1989, however, Kuwait’s
Ministry of Public Planning publicly acknowledged that the bidoon had been
counted as Kuwaiti citizens, thereby inflating the demographic data. The true
proportion of Kuwaitis, the ministry held, was only 28% instead of 40%.
Thereafter, the bidoon were excluded not only from the count of Kuwaiti citizens,
but by 1995, they were excluded completely from population censuses. With no
official government figures on the size of the bidoon population, the most recent
estimates in 2016 have placed it at approximately 112,000 (US Department of State 2015).
While it is true that subjugated peoples “whose history and culture were condemned to death
by state nationalism sought cultural diversity,” (Jalata 2001:387) the Bedoon are fighting for
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inclusion because they contend that their history and culture are the same as that of the state.
This points to their exclusion not being due to a threat of diversity to the state, but its value as a
tool with which to define the state itself as well as the stratification of the people within it.
“Rather than benign inclusive nationalism, specified exclusion was the predominant logic of
nation-state building in a century obsessed with stability and growth. The result has been
institutional reinforcement of racial, ethnic, and other distinctions of identity, which people
embrace as primordial, retain and act upon even after institutional boundaries have been
reformed” (Marx 1998:278). For the Bedoon of Kuwait, a claim for inclusion has its roots in
their “ethnic heritage as Arabs and the Kuwaiti, tribal-rooted national identity” (Abdulkarim
2017). The Bedoon present a complication for the colonial logic behind the structure and
parameters of the state and its citizenship. Given that all six GCC countries have historically
intermarried and mixed, tribal claims undermine the colonial borders that the Gulf nations have
been working hard to assert to lay clear claim to territorial resources like oil.
In fact, the exclusion policy of a category of people serves to uphold the exclusivist nationstate identity. The nationals identify with Kuwait as citizens because citizenship is what the
Bedoon are denied. Kuwaiti citizens uphold the system because it supplies them with economic
and social stability and comfort while the Bedoon serve as a threat of all that could be lost
without the precious nation-state and its stratifying social hierarchy. The exclusion of the Bedoon
becomes a cautionary tale through which nationals learn to place their national identity and
citizenship in an almost holy regard. This creates a permanent siege mentality where outsiders
are perceived to be constantly reaching for the honey pot of resources offered by the nation to its
citizens. The resulting panic justifies the increasingly restricted pathways to citizenship offered
by the government as well as general xenophobic attitudes.
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1985 marked a pivotal moment for the Bedoon and a seminal development in the process
of their civil exclusion. The government began applying provisions of the Aliens Residence Law
17/1959, to the Bedoon. The state changed the official classification of the Bedoon from
“undefined nationality,” which hinted at some hope of definition and inclusion, to “illegal
residents.” Prior to this, the Kuwaiti government considered the Bedoon “lawful residents of
Kuwait whose claims to citizenship were being considered” (Kuwait: Promises Betrayed Discrimination Based on Origin and Status: The Bidun 2000). This shift definitively criminalized
their existence and made claims to citizenship even more out of reach. This change was not only
symbolic but had and continues to have stratifying consequences that blanket every aspect of the
Bedoon’s lives. Prior to 1985, the Bedoon were included in the total number of Kuwaiti citizens
in the Ministry of Planning's Annual Statistical Abstract and were issued with documents
identifying them as Bedoon. “With the exception of voting rights they received the benefits of
full citizens, including subsidized housing, education, and health services” (Kuwait: Promises
Betrayed - Discrimination Based on Origin and Status: The Bidun 2000).
In 1985 the government began applying provisions of Aliens Residence Law 17/1959 to
the Bidun and issued a series of regulations stripping the Bidun of almost all their
previous rights and benefits. In 1986 the government severely restricted Bidun's
eligibility for travel documents. It also fired government employees not employed by the
army or the police who could not produce valid passports, whether issued by Kuwait or
another country, and instructed private employers to do the same. In 1987 the
government began refusing to issue Bidun new or renewal driver's licenses or register
their cars, and began ending public education for Bidun children and instructing private
schools to require valid residency permits. In 1988 the ban on public education was
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extended to the university, and Kuwaiti clubs and associations were instructed to dismiss
their Bidun members. Also beginning in 1988, statistical data on Bidun in the
government's Annual Statistical Abstract was transferred from the Kuwaiti category to
alien population categories (Kuwait: Promises Betrayed - Discrimination Based on Origin
and Status: The Bidun 2000).
Their illegal classification puts the Bedoon even lower in Kuwait’s social hierarchy than
migrants. By denying them official documentation, the state effectively prohibits them from civil
inclusion in the form of adequate work (in both the public and private sectors), health care, and
educational services. They cannot “rent or purchase real estate or cars, open bank accounts,
enroll in private universities and some private schools; hold legal employment; and receive birth,
marriage or death certificates” (United Kingdom Home Office 2006, pp. 24).
This imprisons the Bedoon in a state that not only excludes them from citizenship, but civil
participation as well. Citizenship in Kuwait functions like a ticket, if you don’t have one you
cannot go on the ride. Migrants can enter the amusement park, but without a ticket, they cannot
go on any of the rides. The Bedoon, on the other hand are prohibited from even entering the park
due to their illegal status. Along with the immobilization of the Bedoon, their criminalization has
also cast a suspicious stigma upon them. Their illegal label assumes fault and culpability in their
vulnerable state. They are born criminal and live within Kuwaiti society fighting for citizenship.
Instead, thir criminal status shrouds them in a cloud of stigmatization promoting the Bedoon as
uneducated, uncivilized, and unworthy.
Denying the Bedoon all forms of official identification not only contributes to their
stratification and exclusion on a civil level, but a social one as well. Without proof of Kuwaiti
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citizenship, the Bedoon cannot access the free elementary through secondary education that has
been declared a right for all Kuwaitis (Longva 1997, pp. 37).
Without legal status, their employment opportunities are meager and their compensation,
meek. They cannot afford the expensive private school tuition and are in turn forced to settle
“lower-quality schools, often community schools close to their dwellings and totally devoid of
Kuwaiti students” (Abdulkarim 2017, pp.26-27). This not only relegates them to an education of
a lower standard, but also excludes them from social engagement with the rest of the population,
Kuwaiti or otherwise. These forms of stratification extend to higher education within the
country. While there are a number of private universities that would accept Bedoon students,
their prices effectively exclude them. The country’s only public university, Kuwait University, is
free to all Kuwaitis and the children of Kuwaiti mothers, who according to Kuwait’s Nationality
Law are not technically citizens. In fact, the university requires the children of Kuwaiti mothers
(and non-Kuwaiti fathers) to submit additional documents including the student’s birth
certificate, the mother’s valid ID card, and the mother’s original Certificate of Nationality.
Kuwait University includes an additional category: “Illegal Residents Born to non-Kuwaiti
Mothers” with an enrollment cap of one hundred students. “In addition to receiving security
clearance from the Central Apparatus for Illegal Residents, these students must have achieved a
minimum 90% in their high school diploma. No such requirement exists for Kuwaiti students,
and this percentile is in fact higher than the requirement for all the university’s merit-based
scholarships, for which students in this category are not eligible” (Abdulkarim 2017, pp. 27-28;
Kuwait University 2016-2017).
While there are no laws prohibiting intermarriage between Kuwaiti nationals and the Bedoon,
or migrants for that matter, there are both economic and social considerations that disincentivize
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it. The state bestows monetary resources upon newlyweds, which are meant to help them start
their lives and build a home. If a Kuwaiti man marries a non-Kuwaiti woman, including a
Bedoon woman, he would still be eligible for state benefits, whereas a Kuwaiti woman marrying
a non-Kuwaiti man would not. Her kids would also be deemed ineligible for the Kuwaiti
nationality. This means that if she, a Kuwaiti citizen, has a child fathered by a Bedoon man, their
child too would be stateless, suffering the consequences of being born an illegal resident as well
as the concomitant social stigma.
Beyond the lack of economic opportunities, civil liberties, and acknowledgment of their
rights, the Bedoon carry with them a stigma that shows no signs of erosion.

On May 16, 2000, Kuwait's National Assembly passed legislation intended to allow
naturalization under article 5 of the Nationality Law of some Bidun who had proof of longtime residency or were children of Kuwaiti mothers. As amended, article 5 now allows the
naturalization of persons who rendered valuable services to Kuwait; children of Kuwaiti
mothers and fathers who are prisoners of war, dead, or have irrevocably divorced the
mothers; persons resident in Kuwait in and before 1965, as well as their descendants, if the
descendants are born and resident in Kuwait, providing the applicants have maintained their
Kuwaiti residency until the issuance of a decree naturalizing them. Persons eligible for
nationality under article 5 must also meet the conditions in article 4(2), 4(3), and 4(5). As
with article 4, no naturalizations based on long-term residence can take place in a given year
until legislation is passed setting the quota for naturalization in that year -- such legislation
was passed only once in the period from December 1959 to September 1997. Legislation
passed on May 18, 2000 set a quota of 2000 applicants and their families for the year 2000
(Kuwait: Promises Betrayed - Discrimination Based on Origin and Status: The Bidun 2000).
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It is through these policies, backed by class, ethnic, and racial ideologies, that the
stratification of the Bedoon is maintained. Like Al Sur once protected the people of Al Kout, from
the warring Al Sauds, so do Kuwait’s exclusionary practices protect the power structures that
maintain social stratification; building physical and ideological barriers in the form of highways
and implementing policies that legally prohibit the Bedoon from participating in society. Notions
of belonging and citizenship are now related to a historically physical proximity to a given place
(the land within Al Sur), and casting the Bedoon away to the outskirts of the city widens the map
so that everyone else seems closer to Al Sur in relation to them.
Kuwait’s stateless persons are not a passive group upon which stratification is imposed.
There are among them prominent advocates and momentum for their cause has ebbed and flowed
(Abdulhakim al-Fadhli, Grey Area, 2011 demonstrations, 2019 demonstrations, etc.). In February
and March of the 2011 Arab Spring, hundreds of Bedoons protested in “neighborhoods on the far
outskirts of Kuwait City, where government forces used tear gas and water cannons to break up
the gatherings, and detained dozens of apparently peaceful protestors” (Prisoners of the Past
2011). “These arbitrary arrests primarily targeting peaceful protesters, activists and human rights
defenders in Kuwait are not only unlawful, but are only set to exacerbate an already tense situation
brought to the fore by the young man’s suicide” said Lynn Maalouf, Middle East Research director at
Amnesty International (International Observatory of Human Rights 2019). The suicide of 20-yearold Ayed Hamad Moudath in 2019 after the government denied him civil documentation, “which is
needed to access public services, as well as to study and work” sparked outrage and protest
(International Observatory of Human Rights 2019). Director of Kuwaiti Bidoon Movements,
Mohamed Albadry Alenezi, addressed the World Conference on Statelessness in the Hague saying, “I
hope this voice reaches to the world that we are looking for international protection. Come and open the
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file of the Bidoon, because the government itself is changing everything on the ground, till we lose all our
rights” (International Observatory of Human Rights 2019).
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PART V: MIGRANTS
The vast majority of Kuwait’s migrant population is made up of wage and domestic labor
migrants from South Asia and East Africa. These labor migrants are marginalized and racialized
in Kuwait society. Race is ascribed a socioeconomic place within the hierarchy of Kuwaiti
society. This place corresponds with preconceived beliefs of intelligence, work ethic, even
worthiness and essential goodness. This process of othering is a necessary function of the global
capitalist racial project which justifies the exploitation of labor. While all migrants must arrive
through the Kuwait’s immigration policies, they do not disembark equally at same place within
the social and racial hierarchy of Kuwaiti society. The vastly polar worlds that ‘migrants’ and
‘expats’ occupy vividly illustrate the immensely racial nature of immigration. The word expat
refers to white Westerners living in Kuwait. Although their legal status is identical to that of
migrants who are not white nor Western, they are seen as a valuable addition to Kuwait’s
economy and society due to a narrative of their superior capacity and productivity. “In terms of
capacity and productivity, those who are racial 'others' are among the most effective economic
producers due to their vulnerability to labor exploitation and low pay, yet capacity and ability is
attributed more to white bodies rather than the prolific brown bodies” (Puar 2017). The presence
of whiteness is seen as an indicator of Kuwait’s standing as a global ‘progressive’ society. This
implies that whites are modern and civilized, and nonwhites are primitive and uncivilized. The
migrants are commonly brown, poor, and engage in domestic and wage labor. They come from
South Asia and East Africa and represent a wide range of cultures, religions, and languages.
Unlike their white Western counterparts, they are not seen as a desirable demographic. Although
they are in fact the engine behind Kuwait’s economy, their presence is seen as a favor and
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privilege for them. The Kuwaiti elites claim that they are lucky we allow them economic
opportunities because where they come from is so much worse.
Migration and immigration have always had a significant role within Kuwait and the Gulf in
general, in fact, they arguably are “fundamental to the construction of a multi-sectarian ArabIslamic identity” (Nisan 2002). This movement continued through the advent of post-colonial
nation-states, this time with the restriction of formal citizenship rights centered on states. “The
image of the nation-state implies a convergence of the polity and of unified and inclusive loyalty
to it, thereby supposedly overwhelming or healing subnational social cleavages” (Marx
1998:275). In reality, when the state and nation-building process began, these emerging nationstates were cementing fragile national identities and territories through the exclusion of new
communities and “various sectarian and linguistic groups” (Sater 2014:294). The nation-state
building process operates so that the state can play its “essential role in further containing
conflict, providing protection, and managing growth. This goal was imported from Europe to
other countries where states had been earlier constructed by colonialism” (Marx 1998:275). The
construction of these states, whether colonies or in the case of Kuwait protectorates, was heavily
influenced by colonial power.
By the mid-1970s, the Gulf had seen a dramatic rise in its migrant population (more than
52% of Kuwait’s population and 75% of the population in Qatar and the UAE) (MacroTrends
2020). This shift in the region’s demographics and its rapidly growing participation in the global
economy, are at the core of Gulf Arab states’ (including Kuwait) development of notions of
citizenship and the importance of asserting nation-state identities (Davidson 2008).

29

The GCC countries, with the addition of Jordan and Lebanon, established the Kafala
(sponsorship) system in the 1950’s to “regulate the relationship between employers and migrant
workers” (ILO, Policy Brief No. 2: REFORM OF THE KAFALA (SPONSORSHIP) SYSTEM).
Under the Kafala system a migrant worker’s immigration status is legally bound to an
individual employer or sponsor (kafeel) for their contract period… The worker must be
sponsored by a kafeel in order to enter the destination country and remains tied to this
kafeel throughout their stay… Often the kafeel exerts further control over the migrant
worker by confiscating their passport and travel documents, despite legislation in some
destination countries that declares this practice illegal (ILO, Policy Brief No. 2:
REFORM OF THE KAFALA (SPONSORSHIP) SYSTEM).
The system’s economic objective is to provide “temporary, rotating labor that could be
rapidly brought into the country in economic boom and expelled during less affluent periods.”
(ILO, Policy Brief No. 2: REFORM OF THE KAFALA (SPONSORSHIP) SYSTEM). The
racialization of certain areas of labor (service industry, domestic work, manual labor, etc.) in
Kuwait is necessary for the othering of migrants who almost exclusively occupy these industries.
"In its system of violent subjugation, older forms of racism that rely on mass extermination and
genocide are integrated with late-twentieth-century forms of political racism based in foreign
policies of abandonment and dispossession, as well as in the kind of cultural racism that views
inherent "essences" an explanation for broad social and cultural differences" (Rana 2011:76-77).
Current rhetoric regarding migration in Kuwait echoes a concerning global trend. Kuwait’s
laws and policies already exclude and limit migrant’s autonomy and participation, yet antimigrant policies continue to be introduced. With bent backs, migrant bodies in Kuwait hold up
the state’s economy and lifestyle, while simultaneously serving as scapegoats for economic and
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state services’ shortcomings, all of which have been exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic.
Migrants’ autonomy over their own bodies is compromised by the Kafala system, the extremely
prejudicial laws governing what migrants can and cannot do make any kind of autonomy over
space and land virtually impossible. McKay links ownership of land to political participation and
social status. Afterall, if within a capitalist world, property is currency with which you buy
political participation, social status, and even your own humanity, what does it mean to be
excluded from the process of property accumulation?
In 2013, the Ministry of Health announced that public hospitals’ Outpatient Departments
(OPD) would restrict non-nationals, including the Bedoon, to evening access only. However,
these facilities, which provide non-urgent ambulatory care, serve Kuwaiti nationals throughout
their open hours. Moreover, new projects and developments continue to exclude non-nationals.
The first new government hospital to be built in Kuwait in thirty years will be solely dedicated to
national citizens. These civil exclusions create a society starkly segregated on the basis of
citizenship.
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PART VI: FUTURE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH
The forms of stratification and their functions in Kuwait are numerous. The study of
migration, stateless persons, and citizenship-based stratification in Kuwait is disconnected. This
paper aims to map the many connections and intersections of these topics. It is my goal to
expand on this research in the future to connect and engage with theories and research methods
that can push our understanding of racial, class, and gender-based stratification in Kuwait. In this
section I briefly explore the application of two theoretical frameworks onto the issues discussed
in this paper.
Slow Death
Obesity has been declared an epidemic in the United States and Berlant asks why “not the
bodily harm caused by waged work?” He answers his own question with the claim that the
disconnect is not accidental, the “epidemic concept is not a neutral description.” He explains that
it is “acceptable for their bodies to be run down because it is a worthy sacrifice in capitalist
standards.” I argue that it is through this waged work and exclusionary stratification, that
migrants and stateless people in Kuwait experience slow death.
Global and local regulations converge to create precarious conditions for migrants and
stateless people in Kuwait. They are directed towards low paying labor that endangers with their
bodies through lax labor and safety laws (and a lack of implementation of the few existing legal
protections), through the racialization of certain jobs and the limitations imposed by their legal
status. “As migrant laborers have become one of the foremost commodities traded in the global
economy, wage work has become the domain not solely of domestic labor unions but also of
workers without frontiers who cross the planet in search of employment” (Rana 2011:4). The
very transient nature of migrants’ existence in Kuwait due to the Kafala system, which leaves
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them entirely dependent on sponsorship and frequent residency renewal (not to mention a
potential new law, that is being hotly debated in the parliament and over social media,
reevaluating the residency of all expats over the age of sixty), makes them detached from society
and easy to consume and dispose of. They fill the role of Georg Simmel’s “stranger” (1908). He
is not a part of society, but his role is necessary to its existence. Giorgio Agamben, in Homo
Sacer (1995), would point to migrants and Kuwait’s stateless people as being bound by the
state’s law but not protected by it. Allocating rights to states limits said rights to the way a
person relates to the state (as a citizen) as opposed to a divine right that transcends manmade
structures like the state itself (1995). Migrants and stateless persons must function within the
state but are always strangers to it, either due to the transitionary nature of their immigration
status, or their altogether expulsion and criminalization as is in the case of the stateless person.
Agamben (1995: 138) asks whether there are “human lives that have so lost the quality of legal
good that their very existence no longer has any value, either for the person leading such a life or
for society?” This fusion of rights to citizenship is a function of state legitimization. As he later
writes, “the same bare life that in the ancient regime was politically neutral and belonged to God
as creaturely life and in the classical world was (at least apparently) clearly distinguished as zoē
from political life (bios) now fully enters into the structure of the state and even becomes the
earthly foundation of the state's legitimacy and sovereignty” (1995:127).
Physical Access and Dis-Abling
The term ‘disabled’ is misleading; it suggests a normative standard of ability. But an
ability to do what? In a conversation with Judith Butler, Sunaura Taylor (Taylor 2008) defines
disability as “the disabling effects of society,” while Butler calls it “the social organization of
impairment.” What they are both pointing out is that our concept of ‘ability’ is a social construct.
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The label of ability is awarded to those who can function within a society built specifically for
individuals with a narrow set of characteristics and abilities. Anyone who does not fit this narrow
definition is labeled ‘disabled’ as if it is their body that places them into this category, as
opposed to the architecture of the world around them. Who is to say what set of abilities are
‘standard’ and therefore a prerequisite of a ‘standard’ body? The very definition of ‘ability’ is
not neutral or organic. It is tied to capitalist productivity. You are able bodied as long as you can
be productive in a capitalist economy. “You're only able-bodied until you're disabled” (Puar
2017:12). Through our understanding of these social standards perpetuated by various
institutions, the noun ‘disabled’ (distant and impersonal), becomes a verb: ‘dis-abling’ (ongoing
and targeted).

So, what does this dis-abling have to do with citizenship in Kuwait? What can disability
scholarship help us understand about migrants and stateless persons in Kuwait? In a video
conversation, Butler and Taylor discuss the “social repression of disabled people.” While in no
way am I claiming these experiences are identical, or even significantly similar, I do argue that
borrowing analysis of certain forms of special exclusion in the dis-abling process, can be
productive in better understanding the use of access and space in the categorization of migrants
and stateless persons in Kuwait. Taylor explains that “physical access leads to a social access” so
how have migrants and stateless peoples been denied access to spaces, what are these spaces, and
why? Taylor points to “the fact that disabled people have limited housing options” which is
mirrored in the limited housing options migrants and stateless persons have due to their legal and
immigration statuses. Like disabled people, migrants and stateless persons in Kuwait are limited
in their career options. Their opportunities are dwindled due to legal status, social connections,
as well as the racialization of jobs and industries as opposed to conceptions of what a body
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should be able to do. “We are socially isolated, in many ways there is a cultural aversion to
disabled people,” says Taylor. Our aversion to migrants and stateless peoples is so tangible and
blatant in our process of zoning them away to the outskirts of the city where we don’t have to
suffer their sight. They are both socially isolated due to various institutions in the form of limited
work opportunities, geography/zoning/rental laws, marriage, legal access, and social norms of
class interactions. Due to class and racial/ethnic divides, there is a definite hierarchy within
which both the Bedoon and migrants are ranked at the very bottom, making them undesirable and
ineligible.

This physical isolation and denial of access is in fact by design. This divide illudes to
what Brett Story (2013:753) calls the “transgressive potential of cross-class contact and the
threat it poses to capitalism as well as into the social transformations possible at our own outer
limits.” There is power in mingling and the sharing of place that is deeper than a body occupying
space. Walter Benjamin calls the streets ‘the dwelling place of the collective’ (Story 2013:754)
but even when migrants and stateless persons walk through the streets of the city, with what
agency do they do so? Do they walk softly through it as guests do? Do they leisurely stroll as
tourists would? Are they allowed or able to march about with the confidence of a ‘local,’ a
‘native,’ a citizen? Have migrants and stateless persons created, among themselves, spaces
through which they do march with agency?
Kuwait doesn’t have homeless people. What it does have are slums designated to
migrants and stateless persons through zoning laws and welfare projects. There is a clear
economic segregation, and due to global labor migration, class in Kuwait is deeply racialized
making this segregation racial as well. This physical isolation of the lower class is tied to land
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ownership and capital. “We gauge property values by the evisceration of surplus bodies” (Story
2013:754). This segregation is a form of physical exclusion and an expulsion of migrant and
stateless bodies, which are deemed surplus as soon as their labor has been extracted. The
increasingly restrictive eligibility requirements to acquire a driver’s license in a place as
unwalkable as Kuwait only exacerbates this separation. The policing and zoning away of surplus
bodies launches a sensory attack on its targets. The “settler colony uses sensory stimuli in a
confrontational manner and with the aim of invading the realm of experience of the colonized,
producing exclusivity and hegemony on the basis of cultural, religious, national and security
claims” (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2017:1279). The physical alienation of stateless peoples and
migrants through denied access to spaces, and zoning functions similarly. If migrants and
stateless persons have been dis-abled through access denial, through zoning, through expulsion,
exclusion, and alienation, I echo a question poignantly posed by Story; “Might it be that contact
is revolutionary?” (2013:759).
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VII: CONCLUSION
Ultimately, this paper examines the many forms of racial, gender, and class-based
stratification and their maintenance through Kuwait’s citizenship and immigration policies. It
provides an overview of three complex categories of the Kuwaiti population: Kuwaiti citizens,
migrants, and the Bedoon. Historic, religious, economic, and political factors play important
roles in shaping how this stratification is maintained using racial and ethnic conceptions, gender
roles, and class division. Utilizing legal documents provided clear and tangible examples of the
institutionalization of these strata over the years. Contextualizing the State of Kuwait
geographically is imperative to understanding how colonialism, Islam, trade, and Arab culture
contributed to its attitude and conception of gender, race, ethnicity, and lineage. Kuwait’s
economic history and current demand for migrant labor are directly linked to its geography,
informing the state on its class division and immigration policies. The second part of Kuwait’s
constitution, titled The Basic Foundations of Kuwaiti Society states in its first article that
“Justice, freedom and equality are the pillars of society; and cooperation and compassion are the
firm link binding all citizens.” This paper overlays theory and context to bring forth a more
complex understanding of the nature of stratification and its maintenance in Kuwait, in the hopes
that a better understanding can lead to justice, freedom, and equality for all; and for all to be
bound by cooperation and compassion.
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